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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)0).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The two separate issues set forth by Appellant are redundant and this appeal
actually presents only one issue: Whether the trial court committed reversible error in
ruling that Appellant failed to comply with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
This is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment. This Court reviews the trial
court's ruling for correctness and "may affirm a summary judgment on any ground
available to the trial court, even if not relied on below." Straub v. Fisher & Paykel Health
Care, 1999 UT 102, ^ P6, 990 P.2d 384, 386 (Utah 1999).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
The following statutes and rules are determinative of the issue presented in this
appeal:
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et seq.
"Governmental entity" means the state and its political
subdivisions as defined in this chapter.
"Political subdivision" means any . . . public transit district.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(3) & (7) (1993).
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a
governmental entity, or against an employee for an act or
omission occurring during the performance of his duties,
within the scope of employment, or under color of authority
shall file a written notice of claim with the entity before

maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not the
function giving rise to the claim is characterized as
governmental.
(3)(b) I he notice of claim shall be:
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that
person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal guardian..; and
(ii) directed and delivered to the responsible
governmental entity according to the requirement
Section 63-30- 12 or 63 30 13.
Utah Code Ami. § 63-30-11(2) & (3)(b) (1993).
A claim against a po1
ision, or againsi
employee for
'
-curring durinp
performance <
cope of ei
ni, or
under color o1
:ss notice of claim is
filed with the governing body of the political subdivision
within one year after the claim arises, or before the expiration
of any extension of time granted under Section 63-30-11,
regardless of whether or not thr J "" *:on giving rise to the
claim is characterized as govef
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1993).
I Jtah Rules of Civil Procedure
"I he judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
partv is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law
Utah R. Civ. 1'. X v ; .
Complete texts of these statutes and rules an. (""fovuln! in (lie <, uliliiidiiiii IT n
S" I A f E M E N T OF THE CASE
A.

Statement of Facts
-! >**f

Deienaant/\pj)L

following facts in its statement of undisputed facts in juppoii of summary judgment
2

(R. 18-19) These facts were uncontro verted by Appellant and are thus "deemed admitted
for the purpose of summary judgment" Utah Code Jud. Admin. R4-501(2)(B).
On March 4, 1995, Appellant fell while on a UTA bus. (R. 2, 18) On March 1,
1996, Appellant sent a letter to the office of the Utah State Attorney General, and to
"Utah Transit Authority, Claims Department." (R. 18, 28, 31)1 Appellant's March 1,
1996 letter purported to be a notice of claim under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11, relating
to Appellant's March 4, 1995 accident. (R. 1,18) On March 4, 1997, Appellant filed a
complaint against UTA in Third District Court seeking damages allegedly caused by
Appellant's March 4, 1995 accident. (R. 1-4)
B.

Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in the Court Below
This case involves Appellant's challenge to the trial court's finding that Appellant

failed to comply with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1
et seq. (the "Act"). After answering Appellant's complaint, UTA filed a motion for
summary judgment, seeking dismissal of Appellant's claims against UTA. (R. 16-25) In
its summary judgment motion, UTA argued that Appellant failed to comply with the
Act's notice of claim requirement. (Id.)
Appellant filed a memorandum opposing UTA's summary judgment motion, and a
supporting affidavit from Shawna Powers, an employee of Appellant's counsel. (R. 2833) In her affidavit, Ms. Powers recounted an alleged telephone conversation in which an

1

The record below does not contain a copy of Appellant's March 1, 1996 letter.
However, the March 1, 1996 letter's content and addressees were undisputed below
and/or evident from the record. (R. 18, 31)
3

employee of UTA's risk department supposedly told Ms. Powers that UTA had received
Appellant's March 1, 1996 letter. (R. 33)
UTA filed a reply memorandum in further support of its summary judgment
motion. (R. 34-37) UTA also filed an affidavit from the UTA employee, James
Anderson, with whom Ms. Powers allegedly had the telephone conversation described in
her affidavit. (R. 38-41) In his affidavit, Mr. Anderson stated, among other assertions,
that when he receives notices of claim he assumes that the claimant also served UTA's
governing board. (R. 40) Hence, Mr. Anderson stated that it was not his practice to
serve such notices on UTA's board because this is the claimant's responsibility. (Id.)
On October 31, 1997, the trial court entered a minute entiy granting UTA's
summary judgment motion. (R. 44) On November 25, 1997, Appellant filed a notice of
appeal from the trial court's decision. (R. 46) In an Order on Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment issued on November 26, 1997, the trial court granted UTA's
summary judgment motion, based on Appellant's failure to comply with the Act. (R. 47)
On October 11, 2000, the clerk of this Court sent Appellant's counsel a letter
stating the Appellant's notice of appeal had been received, and setting forth relevant
deadlines. (R. 49)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court did not commit reversible error in finding that Appellant failed to
comply with the Act. The Act clearly requires that notices of claims against UTA be
filed with UTA's governing body, which is delineated by statute. Yet, Appellant served
her purported notice of claim on an employee of UTA's claims department.
4

Utah appellate courts have consistently mandated strict compliance with the Act,
including the requirement that the "notice of claim must be filed with the correct persons
or entities;' Bellonio v. Salt Lake City Corp,, 911 P.2d 1294, 1296 (Utah Ct App. 1996).
Appellant has advanced no factual or legal reason to excuse her lack of compliance with
the Act. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling that Appellant
failed to comply with the Act.
ARGUMENT
L

APPELLANT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE ACT'S NOTICE
OF CLAIM REQUIREMENTS

As an unequivocal matter of Utah law, the trial court correctly granted UTA's
summary judgment motion based on Appellant's failure to comply with the Act. The Act
plainly provided that "[a] claim against a political subdivision . . . is barred unless notice
of claim is filed with the governing body of the political subdivision within one year after
the claim arises." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1993). UTA is a public transit district
and a political subdivision for purposes of this requirement. See id. § 63-30-2(3) & (7);
Salt Lake On Track v. Salt Lake City, 939 P.2d 680, 681 (Ulah 1997). Under the
codification of the Utah Public Transit District Act applicable when Appellant was
required to file her notice of claim, UTA's governing body was a board of directors. See
Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-1038 (Supp. 1994).
Hence, the Act mandated that Appellant file a notice of claim with UTA's board
of directors within one year of Appellant's March 4, 1995 accident. Appellant did not
comply with this requirement. Instead, Appellant sent a letter purporting to be a notice of

5

claim to the office of the Utah State Attorney General, and to "Utah Transit Authority,
Claims Department," and never filed a notice of claim with UTA's governing board. (R.
18, 28, 31) As a matter of law, Appellant failed to comply with the Act's notice of claim
requirement precluding her claim against UTA.
IL

THE ACT REQUIRES STRICT COMPLIANCE

Utah appellate courts "have consistently required strict compliance with the
requirements of the Immunity Act." Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203
(Utah 1999) (emphasis added). More specifically, Utah appellate courts demand strict
compliance with the requirement that the "notice of claim must be filed with the correct
persons or entities," under penalty of dismissal. Bellonio v. Salt Lake City Corp., 911
P.2d 1294, 1296 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
Hence, Appellant was required to strictly comply with the Act's requirement that
her notice of claim be filed with UTA's board of directors. Mailing a purported notice of
claim to the Attorney General and to UTA's claims department did not meet this
requirement. See Shunk v. State, 924 P.2d 879, 881 (Utah 1996) (affirming dismissal for
failure to serve notice of claim on proper parties); Bellonio v. Salt Lake City Corp., 911
P.2d 1294, 1296 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (same); Lamarr v. Department of Transp., 828
P.2d 535, 540-41 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (same).

III. APPELLANT HAS PRESENTED NO VALID REASON TO EXCUSE
HER FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE ACT
The fact that Appellant mailed her notice of claim to a department within UTA
does not excuse her failure to comply with the Act. Utah courts hold claimants to such a

6

rigid standard under the Act's notice of claim requirements that even "[a]ctual notice
does not cure a party's failure to meet these requirements." Rushton, 977 P.2d at 1203.
Moreover, arguments that a claimant "effectively complied" with the Act's delivery
requirements, or that "the intent of the statute was satisfied," do not permit claimants to
sidestep the Act's notice of claim requirements. LamaiT, 828 P.2d at 540-41.
Moreover, the alleged telephone conversation between an employee of Appellant's
counsel and UTA's employee does not excuse Appellant's failure to strictly comply with
the Act. Nowhere in the affidavit recounting this alleged conversation is it claimed that
anyone from UTA specifically waived proper notice under the Act, or represented that
the Act had been complied with. Also, Appellant's claims regarding the alleged
telephone conversation amount to nothing more than an argument that UTA is estopped
from denying proper service of a notice of claim. "As a general rule, estoppel may not be
invoked against a governmental entity" and exceptions to this rule generally require
"specific written representations by authorized government entities." Anderson v.
Public Service Comm'n, 839 P.2d 822, 827 (Utah 1992) (emphasis added).
Appellant did not obtain written confirmation of the disposition of her purported
notice of claim, even though filing the notice was jurisdictional prerequisite to filing suit
against UTA. In other words, Appellant failed to obtain a specific written representation
by an authorized UTA representative that her notice of claim was correctly filed. This
failure precludes Appellant's claim that UTA is estopped from raising her noncompliance with the Act by an alleged telephone conversation.

7

Finally, the fact that UTA's claims department received a copy of Appellant's
purported notice of claim does not excuse Appellant's failure to file a notice of claim
with UTA's governing board. Service on UTA's board was the responsibility of
Appellant, not UTA. This Court has held that:
Where the statutes are clear... as to the requirement for
serving a notice of claim on a political subdivision, we cannot
require and the statutes do not require that the state or its
subdivisions promptly notify claimants of deficiencies of the
notice of claim so as to allow them an opportunity to timely
rectify their error or deficiency.
Shunk v. State, 924 P.2d 879, 881 (Utah 1996). The Act was clear as to the requirement
for serving a notice of claim on UTA. Hence, this Court should not require, and the
statutes do not require, that UTA's claims department notify Appellant of deficiencies in
her notice of claim.
Appellant defends her failure to comply with the Act by citing Brittain v. State,
882 P.2d 666 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). However, subsequent Utah case law demonstrates
that Brittain does not apply to this case. After its decision in Brittain, the Utah Court of
Appeals ruled that the precedential effect of that case and similar cases "is limited by
their unique factual underpinnings." Bellonio v. Salt Lake City Corp., 911 P.2d 1294,
1297 (Utah Ct App. 1996). More importantly, the Court of Appeals ruled that cases like
Brittain should not "be construed as an indication that [Utah courts] are prepared to
abrogate the long-standing rule requiring strict compliance with all aspects of the
Governmental Immunity Act." Id

8

The "unique factual underpinnings" in Brittain demonstrate why it does not apply
to this case. In Brittain, the court examined a plaintiffs compliance with a former
codification of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12, which required service of a notice of claim
on "the agency concerned." Id at 669. The court ruled that the plaintiffs service of a
notice of claim on the Utah State Risk Management Division met this requirement, due to
the "nebulous and broad[] language" of the "agency concerned" designation. Id. at 670.
In contrast, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1993) required Appellant to serve UTA's
governing body, which is specifically delineated in the Utah Public Transit District Act.
See Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-1038 (Supp. 1994).
Also, the plaintiff in Brittain was claiming against the State, rather than a political
subdivision like UTA. See id. at 668. The court cited to specific statutes and
administrative rules suggesting that serving a notice of claim on the Utah State Division
of Risk Management was appropriate. See id. at 671-72 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 63 A4-101 to -206 & Utah Admin. Code R37-1-1 to -5). These statutes have no application
to UTA and neither does the Brittain holding.
Likewise, the holding in Larsen v. Park City Municipal Corp., 955 P.2d 343 (Utah
1998), also cited by Appellant, does not apply to this case. The Larsen holding dealt with
service of a notice of claim against a city. See id. at 343. The Larsen court noted that, in
serving notices of claim on cities, the city council is the governing body under Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30-13. See id. at 345. However, the court ruled that, under the Utah
2

Appellant's inability to appreciate this distinction is demonstrated by the fact that she
filed her notice of claim with the Utah State Attorney General, which is required only for
claims against the State. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1993).
9

Municipal Code, "the city recorder has such a significant relationship with the city
II

council that one would be justified in filing notice of claim with the recorder." Id. at 346.
The court went on to cite a myriad of statutory provisions that inextricably tied the city
council with the city recorder. See id. (citing statutes).
In contrast, there is no significant relationship between UTA's claims department
and its Board of Directors. Unlike city councils and recorders, no statutes or rules
inextricably link the functions of UTA's claims department and its Board of Directors.
Thus, the Larsen holding has no application to this case and does not excuse Appellant's
failure to strictly comply with the Act.
CONCLUSION
Appellant was required to strictly comply with the Act's notice of claim
requirements. Appellant failed to comply with these requirements and has presented no
valid reason for excusing this failure. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial
court's ruling that Appellant failed to comply with the Act.

3

Likewise, the Utah Court of Appeals' holding in Bischel v. Merritt 907 P.2d 275 (Utah
Ct. App. 1995) has no application to this case. The Bischel case was another case that the
Court of Appeals later limited to its "unique factual underpinnings." Bellonio v. Salt
Lake City Corp., 911 P.2d 1294, 1297 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Specifically, the claimant
in Bischel received confirmation from the "governing body" itself, in that case the county
commission, that service of a notice of claim on the county attorney was appropriate. See
907 P.2d at 278. However, such confirmation is ineffective if it does come from "the
proper agent to receive the statutorily mandated notice of claim." Bellonio v. Salt Lake
City Corp., 911 P.2d at 1297. In this case, Appellant does not claim to have contacted
UTA's Board of Trustees regarding service of a notice of claim. Rather, Appellant
claims to have spoken with an employee of UTA's claims department. Hence, Appellant
did not receive confirmation from the proper agent to receive the notice of claim, and
Bischel does not apply to this case.
10

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of June, 2001.
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Attorneys for Appellee
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(2) The state planning coordinator shall review and forward the comments
and recommendations of the RDCC to:
(a) the governor;
(b) the initiating state agency, in the case of a proposed state action; and
(c) the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel.
History: C. 1953, 63-28a-5, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 6, § 3.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
1994, ch. 6, § 3 repeals former § 63-28a-5, as

enacted by Laws 1981, ch. 187, § 1, listing the
functions and duties of the RDCC, and enacts
the present section, effective May 2, 1994.

63-28a-7. Repealed.
Repeals. — Laws 1994, ch. 6, § 4 repeals
§ 63-28a-7,' as enacted by Laws 1981, ch. 187,

§ 1, providing an effective date for the act,
effective May 2, 1994.

CHAPTER 30
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
Section
63-30-2.
63-30-10.

Definitions.
Waiver of immunity for injury
caused by negligent act or omission of employee — Exceptions.

Section
63-30-18.

Compromise and settlement ofactions.

63-30-1, Short title.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — The Assault and
Battery Exception to Waiver of Governmental
Immunity in Utah, 1994 Utah L. Rev. 400.

63-30-2.

GOVEKNM&fNiAL. II\H*IUL\II

(4) (a) "Governmental function" means any act, failure to act, opers
tion, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or nc
the act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking is charac
terized as governmental, proprietary, a core governmental functioi
unique to government, undertaken in a dual capacity, essential to c
not essential to a government or governmental function, or could \
performed by private enterprise or private persons.
(b) A "governmental function" may be performed by any depar
ment, agency, employee, agent, or officer of a governmental entity.
(5) "Injury" means death, injury to a person, damage to or loss
property, or any other injury that a person may suffer to his person,
estate, that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person or h
agent.
(6) "Personal injury" means an injury of any kind other than proper
damage.
(7) "Political subdivision" means any county, city, town, school distric
public transit district, redevelopment agency, special improvement
taxing district, or other governmental subdivision or public corporatior
(8) "Property damage" means injury to, or loss of, any right, title, estat
or interest in real or personal property.
(9) "State" means the state of Utah, and includes any office, depai
ment, agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, colle^
university, or other instrumentality of the state.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 2; 1973, ch.
103, § 2; 1978, ch. 27, § 1; 1981, ch. 116, § 1;
1983, ch. 129, § 2; 1987, ch. 75, § 2; 1987 (1st
S.S.), ch. 4, § 1; 1988, ch. 2, § 338; 1991, ch.
248, § 6; 1994, ch. 192, § 1; 1994, ch. 260,
§ 79.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment by ch. 192, effective May 2, 1994, substituted "Section 67-5b-104" for "Section 62A-4-

603" in Subsection (2)(a) and made
punctuation change.
The 1994 amendment by ch. 260, effect
j u i y i, 1994, substituted "Section 62A-4a-5'
for "Section 62A-4-603" in Subsection (2)(a).
Thj s s e c tion is set out as reconciled by 1
0 f f i c e o f Legislative Research and Gene
Counsel

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Definitions.

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Claim" means any claim or cause of action for money or damages
against a governmental entity or against an employee.
(2) (a) "Employee" includes a governmental entity's officers, employees,
servants, trustees, commissioners, members of a governing body,
members of a board, members of a commission, or members of an
advisory body, officers and employees in accordance with Section
67-5b-104, student teachers certificated in accordance with Section
53A-6-101, educational aides, students engaged in providing services
to members of the public in the course of an approved medical,
nursing, or other professional health care clinical training program,
volunteers, and tutors, but does not include an independent contractor.
(b) "Employee" includes all of the positions identified in Subsection
(2)(a), whether or not the individual holding that position receives
compensation.
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state and its political subdivisions
as defined in this chapter.

i nw

ANALYSIS
Governmental function.
Cited.
~
. . ,
..
Governmental function.
Trial courts retroactive application of the

against the Utah Division of Water Resour
was error. Richards Irrigation Co. v. Karr
g06 R 2 d 6 (Utah a

A

1994)

Cited in Wright v. University of Utah, .
^
d
c
}
denied 8g3 j
I Q Q ^ T n „ w*.v,i«,**An r«,,
1QKQ nUnu

^^ss^^^^i£ jyar^rr

Cou

63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Schools and school districts.
of public policy in discharge of emplo
Because it is undisputed that the county
Broadbent v. Board of Educ, 910 P.2d 1
school district is a governmental entity dis- (Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert, denied, 917 P.2d
charging a governmental function, the district
(Utah 1996).
would be immune from suit for alleged violation

I
*

ANNOTATED
1953
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UTAH
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ANNOTATED
~~

V

,

-St.

~< -y -

z r

TITLE
State A&eirn
in General

a 993
Replacement

trjr-r^7
MICdIE

J

GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
plicate vehicle title had
t had improperly issued
le certificate upon which
making its loan, was
cal immunity. The issutitles and recordkeeping
governmental functions
ider § 63-30-3. Further,
of immunity for negliunder Subsection (3) of
alleged injury arises out
le certificate. Metropoli14 P.2d 293 (Utah 1986).
Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d
docks v. Salt Lake City
Utah 1987); Loveland v.
P.2d 763 (Utah 1987);
County, 771 P.2d 1053
/. State, 822 P.2d 764
v. Rasmussen, 792 F.
992).

al governmental unit or
287.
or sanitarium for neglisurgeon, 51 A.L.R.4th
or negligent fire inspeciforcement, 69 A.L.R.4th
dence of polygraph test
sal to take test, in action
,ion, 10 A.L.R.5th 663.
1 and slander exception
immunity under Federal
USCS § 2680(h)), 79
USCS §§ 2680(a) and
>rt Claims Act liability
ent informant's conduct,

private propstitution, immunity
:overy of compensaentity has taken or
:ompensation.
ling to the require-

:9, 1991, added "As proion 22 of the Utah Conid "for public uses" in

63-30-11

Subsection (1) and inserted "Eminent Domain"
and made a related punctuation change in Subsection (2).
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v.
Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1990).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law R e v i e w . — Recent Development
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Civil Procedure, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 166.

63-30-10.6. Attorneys' fees for records requests,
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for recovery
of attorneys' fees under Sections 63-2-405 and 63-2-802.
Notwithstanding Section 63-30-11:
(a) a notice of claim for attorneys' fees under Subsection (1) may be
filed contemporaneously with a petition for review under Section 63-2404; and
(b) Sections 63-30-14 and 63-30-19 shall not apply.
(2) Any other claim under this chapter t h a t is related to a claim for attorneys' fees under Subsection (1) may be brought contemporaneously with the
claim for attorneys' fees or in a subsequent action.
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 63-30-10.6, e n a c t e d b y L.
1991, c h . 259, § 50; 1992, c h . 280, § 56.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1992 amendment, effective July 1, 1992, added the reference to § 63-2-405 in Subsection (1).

Effective D a t e s . — Laws 1992, ch. 280,
§ 63 makes L. 1991, ch. 259 effective July 1,
1992.

63-30-11. Claim for injury — Notice — Contents — Service
— Legal disability.
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations t h a t would apply if the
claim were against a private person begins to run.
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or
against an employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance
of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority shall
file a wiitten notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action,
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental.
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth:
(i) a brief statement of the facts;
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are
known,
(b) The notice of claim shall be:
(i) signed by the person making the claim or t h a t person's agent,
attorney, parent, or legal guardian; and
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(ii) directed and delivered to the responsible governmental entity
according to the requirements of Section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13.
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, or mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian at the time the claim arises, the claimant may apply to the court to extend the time for service of notice of
claim.
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental entity, the court
may extend the time for service of notice of claim.
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that exceeds the applicable statute of limitations.
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an extension, the court shall
consider whether the delay in serving the notice of claim will substantially prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining its defense on the
merits.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 11; 1978, ch.
27, § 5; 1983, ch. 131, § 1; 1987, ch. 75, § 4;
1991, ch. 76, § 6.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, added the sub-

section designations in Subsection (3)(b) and
made related changes and deleted "or imprisoned" after "legal guardian" and made related
changes in Subsection (4)(a).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
is to require every claimant to state clearly all
of the elements of his claims to the board of
commissioners or city council for allowance as
a condition precedent to his right to sue the
city and recover his damages in an ordinary
action. Sweet v. Salt Lake City, 43 Utah 306,
134 P. 1167 (1913).

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Assignment of municipal debt.
Clear statement of claims required.
Conditions for right to recover.
Damages not specified.
Failure to file claim.
Notice.
Sufficiency of notice.
— Nature of claim asserted.
Waiver of objections by city.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
Functions of the notice of claim requirement
in giving the affected governmental entity an
opportunity to promptly investigate and remedy defects immediately, in avoiding unnecessary litigation, and in minimizing difficulties
which might attend changes in administration
provide sufficient justification for its imposition as to governmental but not other tort-feasors, and therefore this section does not deny
equal protection. Sears v. Southworth, 563
P.2d 192 (Utah 1977).
A s s i g n m e n t of municipal d e b t
Assignment directing city to pay debt it owes
assignor to assignee is not kind of claim required to be submitted to city in accordance
with this statute. Cooper v. Holder, 21 Utah 2d
40, 440 P.2d 15 (1968) (decided under former
law).
Clear statement of claims required.
The purpose of notice-of-claim requirement

Conditions for right to recover.
Statutory right to recover is available only
upon compliance with the conditions upon
which right is conferred. One who seeks to enforce the right must by allegation and proof
bring himself within the conditions prescribed
thereby. Hamilton v. Salt Lake City, 99 Utah
362, 106 P.2d 1028 (1940).
D a m a g e s not specified.
A claim that stated the time, place and general nature of the injury and the sidewalk defect causing it fulfilled the purpose of former
section even though the amount of damages
was not stated; since the claim had to be filed
within thirty days of the injury, the exact
amount of damages was impossible to ascertain. Spencer v. Salt Lake City, 17 Utah 2d
362, 412 P.2d 449 (1966) (decided under former
law).
Failure to file claim.
Because no claim was filed as required by
this section, action to recover moneys expended
to construct bridge which city had agreed to
construct was barred. Thomas E. Jeremy Estate v. Salt Lake City, 87 Utah 370, 49 P.2d
405 (1934).
Exceptional circumstances were not present
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to allow a suit for injuries sustained in a plane
crash, since the fact that the plane crashed
gave the plaintiff reasonable grounds to question whether a city was enforcing its ordinance
and requiring an airline regulated by the city
to keep its airplanes in airworthy condition.
Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125
(Utah 1992).
A potential plaintiffs claim that he was prevented from discovering a cause of action for a
plane crash in which he was injured because
the city did not return his phone calls was insufficient; and while a party may be excused
for failing to pursue a claim if the party acted
in reasonable reliance on a defendant's representations, absent any representations or concealment by the defendant, a plaintiff must
take reasonable steps to prosecute the claim.
Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125
(Utah 1992).
Notice.
The supervision of disbursement of escrowed
funds is not of such a unique nature that it
could only be performed by a governmental entity and is not essential to the core of governmental activity; therefore, disbursement of escrowed funds does not constitute a governmental function for purposes of § 63-30-3 and is not
subject to the notice requirement of this section. Cox v. Utah Mtg. & Loan Corp., 716 P.2d
783 (Utah 1986).
Service of notice is a precondition to suit.
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988).
The notice of claim provision would probably
be interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court as
applicable to all claims against state employees, whether or not any judgment might
ultimately be payable by the state, as long as
the employees' alleged acts were in the course
of their employment. Kabwasa v. University of
Utah, 785 F. Supp. 1445 (D. Utah 1990).
The plain meaning of § 63-30-12 requires
that two notices of claim should have been filed
by plaintiff: one to the attorney general and
one to the agency concerned. Although this
statutory requiiement may result in redundant notice, the redundancy apparently is
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mandated by the statute as the Utah attorney
general is the agent and legal counsel for all
state agencies, including the University of
Utah. Kabwasa v. University of Utah, 785 F.,
Supp. 1445 (D. Utah 1990).
Sufficiency of notice.
Under this section, a notice in which damages were specified as "for general impairment" of an automobile was an insufficient description of the damages and one which could
not be cured by amendment. Sweet v. Salt
Lake City, 43 Utah 306, 134 P. 1167 (1913)
(decided under former law).
—Nature of claim asserted.
A notice of claim for physical and emotional
distress resulting from an alleged assault and
battery at the hands of police officers was an
insufficient description of the "nature of the
claim asserted" to permit plaintiff to amend
her complaint, after the time had run for filing
notice, to allege malicious prosecution and
false arrest. Yearsley v. Jensen, 798 P.2d 1127
(Utah 1990).
Waiver of objections by city.
In action against city for injuries sustained
as result of defective sidewalk, objection that
plaintiff's claim was not verified and did not
sufficiently describe extent of injury was
waived by city, where it did not decline to consider claim, but acted upon it. Bowman v.
Ogden City, 33 Utah 196, 93 P. 561 (1908) (decided under former law).
Failure to file claim barred action against
town; consideration of claim by town did not
waive the filing requirement. Hurley v. Town
of Bingham, 63 Utah 589, 228 P. 213 (1924).
City council had no discretion to waive verification of notice of street or sidewalk injury
claims; evidence of waiver or estoppel by city
employees respecting filing of notice was inadmissible where not alleged. Hamilton v. Salt
Lake City, 99 Utah 362, 106 P.2d 1028 (1940)
(decided under former law).
Cited in Schultz v. Conger, 755 P.2d 165
(Utah 1988); Jepson v. State, 846 P.2d 485
(Utah Ct. App. 1993).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Amount of damages stated in notice of claim against municipality or county as
limiting amount of recovery, 24 A.L.R.3d 965.
Incapacity caused by accident in suit as affecting notice of claim required as condition of
holding state and local governmental unit liable for personal injury, 44 A.L.R.3d 1108.
Attorney's mistake or neglect as excuse for
failing to file timely notice of tort claim
against state or local governmental unit, 55
A.L.R.3d 930.

Plaintiffs right to bring tort action against
municipality prior to expiration of statutory
waiting period, 73 A.L.R.3d 1019.
Maintenance of class action against governmental entity as affected by requirement of notice of claim, 76 A.L.R.3d 1244.
|
Local government tort liability: minority as
affecting notice of claim requirement, 58
A.L.R.4th 402.
Insufficiency of notice of claim against mu-
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quirement in this sect'
682 F. Supp. 1528 (D.

nicipality as regards statement of place where
accident occurred, 69 A.L.R.4th 484.

63-30-12, Claim against state or its employee — Time for
filing notice.
A claim against the state, or against its employee for an act or omission
occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with
the attorney general and the agency concerned within one year after the claim
arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time granted under Section
63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is
characterized as governmental.
H i s t o r y : L. 1965, ch. 139, § 12; 1978, ch.
27, § 6; 1983, ch. 131, § 2; 1987, ch. 75, § 5.
C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Actions arising out of
contractual rights or obligations not subject to
this section, § 63-30-5.

Health Care Malpractice Act, § 78-14-1 et
seq.
Mailing claims to state or political subdivisions, § €3-37-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Cause of action.
Claims for death.
Compliance with section.
Federal claim.
Notice.
Quiet title actions.
Remedy for wrongful act.
Cited.
C a u s e of a c t i o n .
A cause of action against the state accrues at
the time of the subject accident rather than
when a plaintiff satisfies the threshold requirements under § 31A-22-309. Jepson v. State,
846 P.2d 485 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Claims for death.
In cases involving claims for death, the statutory period would begin to run on the date of
death of the person injured, inasmuch as that
is the date upon which the damage accrues to
the personal representative or third party entitled to recover for the wrongful death. Nelson
v. Logan City, 103 Utah 356, 135 P.2d 259
(1943) (decided under former law).
Compliance with section.
Complaint alleging that tax commission and
its agent acted maliciously and arbitrarily in
attempting to enforce payment of excise taxes
and in compelling plaintiff to supply a surety
in greater amount than was reasonable to ensure payment of the tax, requesting damages
both compensatory and punitive, was fatally
defective in that it did not allege compliance
with this section; tax commission and its agent
were immune from suit for damages where the

acts complained of were performed in good
faith and within the statutory authority
granted to them. Roosendaal Constr. & Mining
Corp. v. Holman, 28 Utah 2d 396, 503 P.2d 446
(1972).
Plaintiffs complied with this section by filing, within a year after the cause of action
arose, a notice of claim with the attorney general and the agency concerned on the same day
they filed the original complaint with the
court, and amended complaint alleging compliance with the Governmental Immunity Act
was filed, as a matter of right, within one year
after denial of the claim or after the end of the
90-day period in which the claim is deemed to
have been denied. Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Office, 621 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1980).
Action against state predicated on governmental supervision of financial institutions involved the exercise of a governmental function
and was barred where there was no compliance
with the notice of claim provisions of
§§ 63-30-11 and 63-30-12. Madsen v. Borthick,
658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983).
In an action against the Utah State Department of Transportation, this section, requiring
notice both to the attorney general and the department, is applicable, not Rule 4(e)(ll) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; an action
against the state is barred if the notice required by this section is not filed. Lamarr v.
State DOT, 828 P.2d 535 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Federal claim.
A federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may
not be barred by failure to meet state statutory
requirements, such as the "notice of claim'* re-
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Notice.
Service of notice is a precondition to suit.
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988).
(But see note under catchline "Federal claim"
above.)
This section requires that two notices of
claim should have been filed by plaintiff: one to
the attorney general and one to the agency
concerned. Although this statutory requirement may result in redundant notice, the redundancy apparently is mandated by the statute inasmuch as the Utah attorney general is
the agent and legal counsel for all state agencies, including the University of Utah.
Kabwasa v. University of Utah, 785 F. Supp.
1445 (D. Utah 1990).
The notice of claim provision would probably
be interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court as
applicable to all claims against state employees, whether or not any judgment might
ultimately be payable by the state, as long as
the employees' alleged acts were taken in the
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course of their employment. Kabwasa v. University of Utah, 785 F. Supp. 1445 (D. Utah
1990).
Quiet title actions.
Notice of a claim for quiet title complies with
this section if it is given not more t h a n one
year after plaintiffs right to possession has
been disturbed or encroached upon by the
state. Ash v. State, 572 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1977).
R e m e d y for w r o n g f u l a c t .
The 1978 amendment to § 63-30-4 did not
leave the parents without a remedy for their
wrongful birth injury by granting immunity
for simple negligence to doctors employed by
the state, since parents had a remedy against
the state for injuries arising out of the negligent acts of state employees, but the parents
failed to give notice of their claim to the state
within one year as required by this section.
Payne ex rel. Payne v. Myers, 743 P.2d 186
(Utah 1987).
Cited in Forsman v. Forsman, 779 P.2d 218
(Utah 1989); O'Neal v. Division of Family
Servs., 821 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
U t a h L a w Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Torts,
1989 Utah L. Rev. 334.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 72 Am. J u r . 2d States, Territories, and Dependencies §§ 124, 126.

C . J . S . — 81A C.J.S. States §§ 269, 271, 272,
310.
A.L.R. — See A.L.R. Annotations listed under § 63-30-11.
Key N u m b e r s . — States <s= 174, 177, 197.

63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision or its employee — Time for filing notice,
A claim against a political subdivision, or against its employee for an act or
omission occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope of
employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is
filed with the governing body of the political subdivision within one year after
the claim arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time granted
under Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise
to the claim is characterized as governmental.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 13; 1978, ch.
27, § 7; 1983, ch. 131, § 3; 1987, ch. 75, § 6.
C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Actions arising out of
contractual rights or obligations not subject to
this section, § 63-30-5.

Mailing claims to state or political subdivisions, § 63-37-1 et seq.
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et state statutory
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
date of death of the person injured, inasmuch
as that is the date upon which the damage accrues to the personal representative or third
party entitled to recover for such wrongful
death. Nelson v. Logan City, 103 Utah 356,
135 P.2d 259 (1943) (decided under former
law).

ANALYSIS

Administrative proceedings.
Claims barred.
Claims by minors.
Claims for death.
Contract action.
Effect of 1987 amendment.
Estoppel.
Exemptions.
—Equitable claims.
Full compliance required.
Necessity for presentation of claim.
Notice.
Cited.

Contract action.
An action on a contractual obligation is a
claim permitted under this chapter, and notice
of such claim must be filed in accordance with
this section. Baugh v. Logan City, 27 Utah 2d
291, 495 P.2d 814 (1972).

Administrative proceedings.
Tenured teacher seeking reinstatement following decision to terminate his services had
no claim for breach of contract until after adverse result a t administrative hearing provided for by the school termination provisions
(now § 53A-8-101 et seq.); therefore, where he
filed his notice of claim within the statutory
period after termination of the hearing, he
complied with the requirements of this section.
P r a t t v. Board of E d u c , 564 P.2d 294 (Utah
1977) (decided under former law).
Claims barred.
Neither actual knowledge by county officials
of circumstances which resulted in death of
four-year-old child's mother in an automobile
accident nor minority of the child dispensed
with necessity of filing timely claim in action
against county in which it was alleged that
death was due to inadequate warning signs
and an improperly constructed guardrail;
timely claim against county was necessary
even though county highway department employee allegedly advised child's attorney, incorrectly, that highway in question was maintained by state, resulting in initial filing of
claim against state. Varoz v. Sevey, 29 Utah 2d
158, 506 P.2d 435 (1973).
Trial court properly dismissed complaint
against county where notice of the claim was
not filed with the county commission during
the year following plaintiffs discovery of her
injuries. Yates v. Vernal Family Health Center, 617 P.2d 352 (Utah 1980); Yearsley v.
Jensen, 798 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990).
Claims by minors.
Failure of a minor to give notice within the
time provided in this section does not bar the
minor's claim as the time for notice is tolled
during minority by § 78-12-36. Scott v. School
Bd., 568 P.2d 746 (Utah 1977).
Claims for death.
In cases involving claims for death, the statutory period would commence to run on the

Effect of 1987 amendment.
In 1987, the legislature amended this section
to require the timely filing of a notice of claim
irrespective of whether the function giving rise
to the claim is characterized as governmental.
The amendment does not apply retroactively.
White Pine Ranches v. Snyderville Basin
Sewer Improvement Dist., 819 P.2d 801 (Utah
1991).
Estoppel.
County was not estopped from pleading the
filing deadline of the statutory period as a bar
to the claim of a boy who had been injured at
school while playing with dangling wires, even
though the principal of the school erroneously
informed the mother that public service company was responsible for the wires, and she did
not discover until after the filing deadline that
the county tree-trimming employees were in
fact responsible. Scarborough v. Granite School
Dist., 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975) (decided under
former law).
Exemptions.
—Equitable claims.
A subdivider's claims for fees paid under a
municipal ordinance were equitable and therefore exempt from the filing requirements and
time limits imposed by this chapter. American
Tierra Corp. v. City of West Jordan, 840 P.2d
757 (Utah 1992).
Full compliance required.
Before suit against a political subdivision
can be allowed, plaintiff must have fully complied with the statutory requirements; and
thus, prior to filing suit, a claim must be filed
which (1) is in writing, (2) states the facts and
the nature of the claim, (3) is signed by the
claimant, (4) is directed and delivered to someone authorized to receive it, and (5) has been
filed within the prescribed time. Scarborough
v. Granite School Dist., 531 P.2d 480 (Utah
1975).
Necessity for presentation of claim.
Plaintiff had no cause of action for damages
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County ex rel. Valley View Medical Center,
531 P.2d 476 (Utah 1975).
Notice requirement
is applicable
to
§ 63-30-9. Parrish v. Layton City Corp., 542
P.2d 1086 (Utah 1975) (decided under former
law).
Notice-of-claim provisions applied to former
county employee's sex discrimination claims
arising from acts occurring after the effective
date of the 1987 amendment, notwithstanding
her contention t h a t the conduct complained of
was continuous in nature, stemming from earlier sexual harassment occurring before the effective date of the amendment. Sauers v. Salt
Notice.
Lake County, 735 F. Supp. 381 (D. U t a h 1990).
The fact t h a t employees of the county in fact
Cited in Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276
knew of the plaintiffs injuries at the time they
(Utah 1985); Schultz v. Conger, 755 P.2d 165
occurred does not dispense with the necessity
(Utah 1988).
of filing a timely claim. Edwards v. Iron

to his crops caused by seepage of water from
defendant city's canal where no claim was presented therefor to city within a year. Dahl v.
Salt Lake City, 45 U t a h 544, 147 P. 622 (1915)
(decided under former law).
Presentation of claim within time fixed by
law is a condition precedent to bringing action
against municipality. Brown v. Salt Lake City,
33 Utah 222, 93 P. 570, 14 L.R.A. (n.s.) 619,
126 Am. St. R. 828, 14 Ann. Cas. 1004 (1908);
Hurley v. Town of Bingham, 63 Utah 589, 228
P. 213 (1924) (decided under former law).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — See A.L.R. Annotations listed under § 63-30-11.
Key N u m b e r s . — Counties «= 200, 203, 213;
Municipal Corporations «- 1001, 1005, 1008,
1021; Schools <s=> 112.

Am. Jur. 2d. — 56 Am. J u r . 2d Municipal
Corporations, Counties, and Other Political
Subdivisions § 680 et seq.
C.J.S. — 20 C.J.S. Counties §§ 239, 240; 64
C.J.S. Municipal Corporations §§ 2173, 2174,
2199; 79 C.J.S. Schools and School Districts
§§ 423, 433.

63-30-14, Claim for injury — Approval or denial by governmental entity or insurance carrier within
ninety days.
Within ninety days of the filing of a claim the governmental entity or its
insurance carrier shall act thereon and notify the claimant in writing of its
approval or denial. A claim shall be deemed to have been denied if at the end
of the ninety-day period the governmental entity or its insurance carrier has
failed to approve or deny the claim.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 14.

63-30-15, Denial of claim for injury — Authority and time
for filing action against governmental entity,
(1) If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action in the district
court against the governmental entity or an employee of the entity.
(2) The claimant shall begin the action within one year after denial of the
claim or within one year after the denial period specified in this chapter has
expired, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is
characterized as governmental.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 15; 1983, ch.
129, § 6; 1985, ch. 82, § 2; 1987, ch. 75, § 7.

205

1
Rule 56. Summary judgment.

(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to
obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse
party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all
or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without supporting
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be filed
and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to
the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the
hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by
interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial
controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon
make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the
extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such
further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified
shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible
in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters
stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit
shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented
or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against
him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing
the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to
permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make
such other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time
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that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the
purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other
party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to
incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged
guilty of contempt.
History: Amended effective November 1,1997.
Amendment Notes. - The 1997 amendment, in Subdivision (c), substituted the first sentence for the
former first sentence which read "The motion shall be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the
hearing"; deleted the former second sentence which read "The adverse party prior to the day of hearing
may serve opposing affidavits"; and deleted "forthwith" following "rendered" in the present second
sentence.
Compiler's Notes. - This rule is similar to Rule 56, F.R.C.P.
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